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Abstract Runtime security policy enforcement systems
are crucial to limit the risks associated with running
untrustworthy (malicious or buggy) code. The inlined
reference monitor approach to policy enforcement, pio-
neered by Erlingsson and Schneider, implements runtime
enforcement through program rewriting: security checks
are inserted inside untrusted programs.
Ensuring complete mediation { the guarantee that
every security-relevant event is actually intercepted by
the monitor { is non-trivial when the program rewriter
operates on an object-oriented intermediate language
with state-of-the-art features such as virtual methods
and delegates.
This paper proposes a caller-side rewriting algorithm
for MSIL { the bytecode of the .NET virtual machine {
where security checks are inserted around calls to se-
curity-relevant methods. We prove that this algorithm
achieves sound and complete mediation and transparen-
cy for a simplied model of MSIL, and we report on our
experiences with the implementation of the algorithm
for full MSIL.
Key words: security policy enforcement, inline refer-
ence monitor, policy ignorant
1 Introduction
In today's networked world, code mobility is ubiquitous.
Applications can be downloaded over the internet, or re-
ceived as an attachment of emails. This support for ap-
plications from potentially untrustworthy sources comes
with a serious risk: malicious or buggy applications can
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lead to denial of service, nancial damage, leaking of
condential information and so forth.
One important class of countermeasures addresses
this risk by monitoring the application at run time, and
aborting it if it violates a predened security policy. The
events monitored are called security-relevant events, and
they typically are operating system calls, or platform
API method calls.
This paper is about such policy enforcement sys-
tems that are rich enough to enforce policies specied
by means of a security automaton [22], an automaton
that denes what sequences of security-relevant events
are acceptable. Several such systems have been designed
and prototyped [10,3,13], and security automata have
been shown to express exactly the policies enforceable
by run-time monitoring [22]. The code access security
architectures present in Java and .NET are an instance
of such systems [10].
In standard policy enforcement systems, monitoring
applications is integrated into the execution system or
the trusted libraries. This makes it fairly easy to show
complete mediation [21], the property that the moni-
tor sees every occurrence of a security-relevant event.
This paper zooms in on the inlined reference monitor
(IRM) [9] approach, that rewrites untrusted applications
and embeds the monitor directly into the application it-
self. Ensuring complete mediation is non-trivial when
the program rewriter operates on an object-oriented in-
termediate language with state-of-the-art features such
as virtual methods and delegates.
This paper proposes a caller-side rewriting algorithm
for MSIL { the bytecode of the .NET virtual machine {
where security checks are inserted around calls to se-
curity-relevant methods. We prove that this algorithm
achieves sound and complete mediation and transparen-
cy (the property that the behavior of the rewritten pro-
gram does not change if it is compliant with the enforced
policy) for a simplied model of MSIL, and we report
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on our experiences with the implementation of the algo-
rithm for full MSIL.
This paper is an extended version of [23] which has
been published at the International Conference on For-
mal Methods for Open Object-Based Distributed Sys-
tems. While the original paper only contained a proof
sketch, the proofs in this paper have been extended. In
retrospect, one important distinction with existing inline
reference monitors [22,10,3,13] is that the policy itself
is not hardwired into the application. Instead, the in-
line reference monitor only performs interception of all
security relevant events. The decision whether to stop
the execution truncate based on a security policy hap-
pens in a separate policy decision point. Therefore, we
call our approach policy ignorant. This approach allows
evolution of the policy without the need to rewrite the
application.
Section 2 elaborates on the problem statement. In
Section 3, we introduce a simplied model of MSIL and
the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) { the
.NET virtual machine, and we propose a program re-
writer that achieves complete mediation. Sections 4 and
5 explain how this system can be extended to support
virtual method dispatch and delegates. In Section 6, we
describe the implementation of our program rewriter for
the full .NET CLR. Finally, we cover related work and
conclude in Sections 7 and 8.
2 Problem statement
The design space for IRM systems is rich, and dierent
designs have dierent advantages and disadvantages. In
particular, the problem of proving complete mediation
is harder for some designs than for others. We discuss
some of the design parameters, and motivate our design
choices.
A rst important design choice is the security-rele-
vant events. Events can range from individual bytecode
or machine instructions [8] over operating system calls
[19] to Java method calls [9]. The trade-os of these
choices are discussed in [8], and broadly speaking the
conclusion is that ne-grained monitoring allows expres-
sive policies, but coarser-grained monitoring makes poli-
cies simpler to understand and write, and it is suciently
expressive for practical purposes. Our system monitors
method invocations.1
Furthermore, the abstraction level of the method calls
which are monitored is important. Figure 1(a) shows a
simplied architecture for a managed .NET application.
The application calls methods of the API of the plat-
form library, for instance a method to send data over
a network socket. The implementation of this method
calls a lower-level native method, implemented in the
1 A method invocation is when the execution enters a new
method. Method calls are rst dispatched to nd the actual target
method before they are invoked.
Application
PlatformLibraries
Runtime System
Operating System
Abstraction level
API calls
Native calls
Syscalls
(a) Abstraction level
App’
Platform Libraries
Policy
(b) Rewritten application
public void ClientMethod()f
==security checks
Event();
==security checks
g
(c) caller-side
public void Event()f
==security checks
==original code
==security checks
g
(d) callee-side
Figure 1. Design decisions for a policy enforcement systems
runtime system. The native methods in turn performs
system calls.
A second important design choice is whether to mon-
itor the high-level methods that the application calls di-
rectly, or the low-level methods that are the most prim-
itive abstraction of the system resources. Current re-
search usually expresses security policies in terms of low-
level methods [9,3]. This makes it easy to write policies
that limit access to system resources, for instance limit
the amount of network trac, or le access. The higher
level methods need not be monitored directly, because
their implementations will call the lower level methods.
Unfortunately, as current system libraries can be com-
plex, it can be hard for application developers to de-
termine the security-relevant behavior of their applica-
tion, since they make use of high-level methods. Fur-
thermore, policy writers often want to selectively allow
certain high-level methods, even if it executes a low-level
method that is forbidden (e.g. using a logging method,
even if access to the le system is not allowed).
In this paper, we use the high-level platform API
methods to write policies. Security-relevant events are
invocations of methods dened in the trusted system li-
braries from inside the untrusted application. This ap-
proach is similar to monitoring unmanaged applications
at the boundary between kernelspace and userspace. In
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other words, we monitor the control ow transitions be-
tween Application and Platform Libraries in Figure 1(a).
A third design parameter is where to insert security
checks. With callee-side program rewriting, the rewriter
inserts checks inside the body of security-relevant meth-
ods (See Figure 1(d)). In a safe execution mechanism,
it is fairly easy to show that untrusted applications can
not circumvent security code. On the other hand, selec-
tively allowing calls based on the call site is much harder.
Since we only want to monitor calls originating from
the (untrusted) application, callee-side program rewrit-
ing is troublesome. Also, the rewriter needs to modify
the trusted system libraries and this can be impossible,
for instance when they are in ROM on a mobile device, or
when a third party performs the inlining of the applica-
tion as a service (as proposed in the S3MS project [20]).
In this paper, we use caller-side program rewriting,
where the rewriter inserts checks at the call site (See
Figure 1(c)).
Finally, a fourth design choice is what to inline: the
policy enforcement code itself, or just a call to an ex-
ternal component that implements the policy. Both ap-
proaches are used in other systems, and the dierences
between the two approaches are minor. For convenience
reasons { it is easier to formulate the complete mediation
property we want to prove { we inline calls to a separate
Policy Decision Point (PDP).
Figure 1(b) shows how the untrusted application is
transformed into a new application and this new appli-
cation invokes a method in the PDP before and after
each security-relevant event.
Illustration of the issues
IRM's are a powerful policy enforcement mechanism, but
showing that a monitored application cannot subvert the
security checks can be complex, in particular for IRM's
based on caller-side rewriting. The security checks are
inlined statically, and executed before the method call
has been dispatched. In modern execution systems, this
raises a number of important challenges:
{ When using virtual methods or interfaces, the tar-
get method can usually not be determined statically.
At runtime, the target is determined using the run-
time type of the target object. An attacker could try
to circumvent the security policy by casting an ob-
ject to its base type and executing a security-relevant
method using virtual dispatch. Alternatively, an at-
tacker might inherit from the trusted system libraries
or override the behavior of a security-relevant method.
{ With delegates, the situation is even worse. A dele-
gate points to a set of methods, and methods can be
added to or removed from this set at runtime. Invok-
ing the delegate invokes all methods in the set. An
attacker could try to hide a call to a security-relevant
method by adding it to a delegate and calling this
delegate.
In short, achieving complete mediation with a caller-
side program rewriter is much more challenging than us-
ing callee-side program rewriter. This is the key problem
addressed in this paper.
3 Base system
In this section, we prove sound and complete mediation
and transparency for a simplied model of the .NET
CLR [11].
3.1 Execution System
Our formal model of the .NET CLR is based on Fruja's
formalization [14]. Our model in this section supports
assemblies (the .NET components, similar to Java's jar
les), classes with (possibly static) non-virtual methods,
and exceptions. Later sections discuss the extension to
virtual methods. We do not model interfaces, value types
or multithreading. We briey describe the formal model,
but since it is relatively straightforward, the reader is
referred to [14] for details.
The execution system is a virtual machine that loads
two assemblies: the untrusted application (U), and the
trusted platform libraries (T). We assume that U has
a method main without input arguments to start the
execution. Each assembly contains a set of classes. A
type is a pair consisting of an assembly and a class name
dened in that assembly.
A method reference is a pair of a type and a method
name (written as Type :: MethodName). The function
retType maps a method reference to the type of the re-
turn value (or the special return type void). locTypes
maps a method reference to a list of types for the local
variables of that method. The function argTypes denes
a list of types for the arguments of a method reference.
If the method is an instance method, the rst argument
is the implicit this argument. Finally, the function code
maps a method reference into a list of instructions, the
bytecode representation of the body of the method. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the instructions that we will need in
this paper. The virtual machine supports more instruc-
tions, but their semantics is straightforward.
An exception handler is a ve-tuple dening the po-
sition of the beginning (inclusive) and end (exclusive)
of the try block, the type of exception that is caught,
and the position of the beginning and end of the catch
block of the handler. The function excHa maps a method
reference into a list of exception handlers.
The execution state of the virtual machine consists
of a heap, a list of activation records and an exception
record. The heap is modeled as a nite map from ad-
dresses to values. heapLookup(heap, address) looks up
4 Dries Vanoverberghe, Frank Piessens: Policy Ignorant Caller-Side Inline Reference Monitoring
instruction explanation
ldc.x load a constant on the evaluation stack
ldloc i load the value of the local variable
at index i on the stack
stloc i store the top value of the stack in the
local variable at index i
and pop it from the stack
brtrue k branch to the instruction at index k if
the top value of the stack is true and
pop that value from the stack
br k unconditional branch to the instruction
at index k
call mref call the method mref using the arguments
on the stack (and remove them from the
stack) and put the return value on the
stack (if return type not void)
ret return from a method (and use the top
value of the stack as return value if
the return type is not void)
throw throw the top value of the stack as an
exception
newobj mref create a new object using the constructor
mref and put a reference to the new
object on the stack
Table 1. Instructions
the value at a given address in the heap. Furthermore,
heapUpdate(heap, address, value) returns a new heap
that results from replacing the content of heap at the
given address by the given value. An activation record is
a ve-tuple consisting of the current program counter,
a list of addresses of the local variables, a list of ad-
dresses for the arguments, a stack of values (the eval-
uation stack) and the method reference of the method
that is being executed. The exception record is a pair
containing the currently active exception, and the next
exception handler that will be tested to handle an excep-
tion. In our formalization, the active exception is always
a value of the type (T,Exception) or (T, SecurityExcep-
tion)(where T is the trusted assembly).
Operational semantics
In a given state, instr denotes the current instruc-
tion that will be considered by the execution system. It
is shorthand for code(mref)[pc] with mref the method
that is currently being executed (the top frame of the
activation records), and pc the current program counter
within this method.
An execution state is in normal execution mode if the
active exception of the exception record is null. Table 1
informally explains the instructions that are relevant for
our algorithm, and Appendix A denes the operational
semantics for the instructions formally.
An execution state is in exception handling mode if
it is not in normal execution mode. Appendix A also de-
nes the operational semantics for exception handling.
Exception handling mode is entered with the throw in-
struction, and it starts by looking for suitable exception
handlers in the current method. An exception handler
is suitable if the current program counter is inside the
scope of the try block, and if the type of the exception is
a subtype of the type of the exception handler. If a suit-
able handler is found, the evaluation stack is cleared and
the active exception is pushed onto the stack. Execution
continues in normal mode with the rst instruction of
the catch block of the exception handler.
If all exception handlers of the current method have
been considered, the exception is propagated to the caller
of the current method, and the execution mechanism
continues searching at the rst handler of the caller.
3.2 The inlining algorithm
Recall from Figure 1(b) that an inlining algorithm takes
an untrusted assembly App as input, and it outputs a
new assembly App0 that noties the PDP of all security-
relevant events. The security-relevant events are the en-
tering into and exiting (both normally or exceptionally)
from security-relevant methods. The security-relevant
methods are a subset (designated by the policy writer)
of the methods dened in the trusted assembly. Noti-
cation of the PDP is done by calling so-called policy
methods in the PDP.
Denition 1 (Policy methods). The functions
before, after and excep map a security-relevant method
mref onto the corresponding policy methods
before(mref), after(mref) and excep(mref) that are
called respectively before enteringmref , after successful
return, and after exceptional return.
before(mref) has the same argument types as mref ,
after(mref) has an additional parameter for the return
value, and excep(mref) has an additional parameter for
the exception.
In our simplied model, we require policy methods to
be part of the trusted assembly. They throw a Securi-
tyException when the policy is violated, and return void
otherwise. Policy methods are not allowed to call back
into the untrusted assembly. The untrusted application
(before inlining) should not contain any calls to policy
methods.
Our inlining algorithm is dened in Figure 2. The al-
gorithm goes through the instruction list of all methods
in the untrusted assembly, looking for call instructions
to a security-relevant method. Each such call instruc-
tion is replaced by a block of code generated using the
generateCode function, dened below. We say that such
call instruction has been processed by the inliner. For
simplication purposes, we do not intercept constructor
calls, but their treatment is identical to a call to a static
method with the new object as return value.
Denition 2 (generateCode). Given an instruction
instr of the form call mref , a list of types localvars, a
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Body = (List(Instr); List(Type); List(ExceptionHandler))
inlinebody :Map(Body;Body)
inlinebody((body; localvars; excha)) =
inlinebodyhelp([]; body; 0; localvars; excha)
inlinebodyhelp(left; []; ; localvars; excha) =
return (left; localvars; excha)
inlinebodyhelp(left; right; i; localvars; excha) =
right == instr; right0
if (instr == call mref and mref is a SRM) f
(newCode; localvars0; newExcha) =
generateCode(instr; localvars; excha; i)
n = #newCode
left0 = patchBranchTargets(left; n; i)
right00 = patchBranchTargets(right0; n; i)
left00 = left0; newCode
excha0 = newExcha; patchExchaPcs(excha; n; i)
return inlinebodyhelp(left00; right00; i+ n;
localvars0; excha0)
g else f
left0 = left; instr
return inlinebodyhelp(left0; right0; i+ 1;
localvars; excha)
g
Figure 2. Program rewriter algorithm
list of exception handlers excha and the index of the in-
struction i, the function generateCode(instr; localvars;
excha; i) returns a block of code dened by the template
in Figure 3, a modied list of types for local variables
and a modied list of exception handlers.
The insertion of the code fragments generated by
generateCode changes the locations of the original in-
structions in the method being rewritten. Since these
locations are used in branch instructions and in excep-
tion handlers, we need to patch these. So the inlining al-
gorithm patches branch targets and exception handlers
using the function patchLocation(n; i) = loc:if (loc >
i) then loc+n 1 else loc, where i is the location of the
call being processed, and n is the size of the generated
code block being inserted.
We discuss in more detail the block of code gener-
ated by generateCode (Figure 3). First, we generate st-
loc instructions to store the arguments that are on the
evaluation stack into new local variables. Because these
variables are new, and this is the only place in the gen-
erated code where values are stored into these variables,
their value does not change after this point. This ensures
that each time the variables are loaded on the stack, the
relevant values on the top of the stack are the same val-
ues as the values initially on the stack.
Next, we use ldloc instructions to load the arguments
on the stack again, and a call instruction to invoke the
before method of the policy.
The remaining part of the code is a try catch struc-
ture. In the try scope, we rst generate instructions to
load the arguments on the stack and call the original
stloc m+ n
: : : 1. Store arguments
stloc m
ldloc m
: : : 2. Reload arguments
ldloc m+ n
call before(mref) 3. Call before method
tryf
ldloc m
: : : 4. Reload arguments
ldloc m+ n
call mref 5. Call original method
stloc m+ n+ 1 6. Store return value
ldloc m 7. Reload arguments
: : : and return value
ldloc m+ n+ 1
call after(mref) 8. Call after method
ldloc m+ n+ 1 9. Reload return value
br end 10. goto end
g catch (SecurityException) f
throw 11. Rethrow exception
g catch (Exception) f
stloc m+ n+ 2 12. Store exception
ldloc m
: : : 13. Reload arguments
ldloc m+ n and exception
ldloc m+ n+ 2
call exception(mref) 14. Call exception method
ldloc m+ n+ 2 15. Reload exception
throw 16. Rethrow exception
end: g
Figure 3. Generated code fragment where n is the number of
arguments of the target method, and m is the number of pre-
existing local variables in the method that is being rewritten.
security-relevant method. Then we store the return value
in a local variable (if the return type is not void). For
the after method of the policy, we generate instructions
to load the arguments and the saved return value on the
stack and to call the after method. Finally, we load the
return value on the stack again, and we branch out of
the try block.
The type of the rst exception handler is Securi-
tyException. Since the class SecurityException is dened
inside the policy, and the rewriter checks that the un-
trusted application does not reference the policy directly,
we can assume without loss of generality that security-
relevant methods do not throw an instance of type Secu-
rityException. Therefore, this exception comes from the
after method. We generate code to simply rethrow the
original exception.
The second exception handler catches any type of ex-
ceptions. Because we assume that the policy methods are
total, this exception is raised inside the security-relevant
method and the exceptional method of the policy must
be executed. We generate instructions to store the excep-
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tion into a local variable, reload the arguments, reload
the exception, call the exceptional method of the policy
and nally reload and rethrow the exception.
3.3 Properties of the inlining algorithm
The rst property we consider is complete mediation [21]:
every security-relevant event is seen by the monitor.
We say that a method invocation, return or excep-
tional return is observable when it crosses the boundary
between the untrusted assembly and the trusted assem-
bly. The function observable(mref;mref 0) returns true
if one of its arguments is dened in the trusted assembly,
and the other one in the untrusted assembly.
An abstract trace of a program is a (possibly in-
nite) list of observable method invocations, returns and
exceptional returns.
Denition 3 (Abstract trace). The abstract trace of
a program is the list of observable method invocations,
returns and exceptional returns that occur when execut-
ing the main method of the program.
Figure 4 shows how to compute the abstract trace, based
on the operational semantics.
For simplication purposes, we assume that security-
relevant methods do not call back into untrusted applica-
tions and they terminate. Furthermore, we assume that
security-relevant methods always return a value to keep
the properties simple.
Denition 4 (Complete mediation). An abstract ex-
ecution trace of an untrusted assembly program satis-
es complete mediation if and only if for each index i in
trace such that trace[i] = Enter(mref; vals) and mref
is security-relevant:
{ trace[i-2]=Enter(before(mref),vals) and trace[i-1]=
Return
{ trace[i+1]=Return(val) implies trace[i+2]=
Enter(after(mref),vals . val)
{ trace[i+1]=Exception(val) implies trace[i+2] =
Enter(excep(mref),vals . val)
We prove that our inliner always produces programs
with completely mediated traces2. First we need some
technical lemmas.
Lemma 1 (No jumps into inlined code). For ev-
ery untrusted assembly P , let P 0 = inline(P ). For all
possible runs of P 0, control ow can enter a code block
inserted during inlining only through the rst instruction
of the block.
Proof. The patching of the branch targets makes sure
that there are no jumps into the generated code, thus
control ow must enter through the rst instruction.
2 In the remainder of this section, we assume that the assemblies
do not contain the callvirt and ldftn instructions. This restriction
will be relaxed in the next sections.
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S0; E0) #S0 = #S + 1
S0 = ; ( ; ; argAdr; ;mref) S = ; (pc; ; ; ; oldmref)
code(oldmref)[pc]! = newobj
observable(mref; oldmref)
argTypes(mref) ==
 !
A 1::n !v = heapLookup(H 0; argAdr)
trace(H;S;E) = Enter(mref; !v ); trace(H 0; S0; E0)
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S0; E0)
#S0 = #S   1 S = ; (pc; ; ; evalStack;mref)
S0 = ; ( ; ; ; ; oldmref) observable(mref; oldmref)
E = (null; ) code(mref)[pc] = ret
retType(mref)! = void evalStack = evalStack0; v
trace(H;S;E) = Return(v); trace(H 0; S0; E0)
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S0; E0) #S0 = #S   1
S = ; (pc; ; ; ;mref) S0 = ; ( ; ; ; ; oldmref)
observable(mref; oldmref) E = (null; )
code(mref)[pc] = ret retType(mref) == void
trace(H;S;E) = Return; trace(H 0; S0; E0)
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S0; E0) #S0 = #S   1
S = ; ( ; ; ; ;mref) S0 = ; ( ; ; ; ; oldmref)
observable(mref; oldmref) E = (v; ) v! = null
trace(H;S;E) = Exception(v); trace(H 0; S0; E0)
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S0; E0) #S0 = #S
trace(H;S;E) = trace(H 0; S0; E0)
Figure 4. Computation of the trace of a program
Lemma 2 (Complete replacement). Any call
instruction that invokes a security-relevant method at
run time, has been processed by the inliner.
The proof of this lemma is trivial in this execution
system. However, this is the key lemma that breaks when
adding delegates or virtual method dispatch. Later sec-
tions discuss how to maintain this lemma in the presence
of delegates and virtual calls, and this will require im-
provements to the inliner.
Lemma 3 (Abstract trace of generated code). The
code blocks output by generateCode can only generate
the following traces:
1. Enter(before(mref), vals), Exception(exc),. . . with exc a
SecurityException.
2. Enter(before(mref), vals), Return, Enter(mref, vals), Ex-
ception(exc),
Enter(excep(mref), vals . exc), Exception(exc2), . . . with
exc not a SecurityException and exc2 a SecurityExcep-
tion.
3. Enter(before(mref), vals), Return, Enter(mref, vals), Ex-
ception(exc),
Enter(excep(mref), vals . exc), Return, . . . with exc not a
SecurityException.
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4. Enter(before(mref), vals), Return, Enter(mref, vals), Re-
turn(val),
Enter(after(mref), vals . val), Exception(exc), . . . with exc
a SecurityException.
5. Enter(before(mref), vals), Return, Enter(mref, vals), Re-
turn(val),
Enter(after(mref), vals . val), Return, . . .
Proof. Taking into account the restrictions that (1) pol-
icy methods do not call back into the untrusted assembly,
and (2) policy methods can only throw SecurityExcep-
tions or return void, the proof is straightforward.
Theorem 1 (Complete mediation of the algorithm).
For every untrusted assembly P , let P 0 = inline(P ). The
abstract trace trace0 of P 0 satises complete mediation.
Proof. For eachEnter(mref; vals) in trace0 wheremref
is security-relevant :
1. Using the computation rules for traces (Figure 4),
the Enter can only be caused by a call instruction.
2. By Lemma 2, each call instruction that can poten-
tially result in invoking a security-relevant method
has been replaced by a block of generated code.
3. Using Lemma 1, the only way to start the execution
of the generated block of code is by starting at the
rst instruction.
4. According to Lemma 3, the generated code can only
lead to ve possible traces. Because we have an
Enter(mref; vals) in the trace, trace 1 is not pos-
sible. In all other cases complete mediation holds by
Denition 4.
The second property we consider is sound mediation.
Denition 5 (Sound mediation). An abstract exe-
cution trace of an untrusted assembly program satises
sound mediation if and only if for each index i in trace:
{ trace[i]=Enter(before(mref),vals) and trace[i+1]=
Return implies trace[i+2]=Enter(mref, vals)
{ trace[i]=Enter(after(mref),vals . val) implies trace[i-
2]=Enter(mref, vals) and trace[i-1]=Return(val)
{ trace[i]=Enter(excep(mref),vals . val) implies trace[i-
2]=Enter(mref, vals) and trace[i-1]=Exception(val)
Theorem 2 (Sound mediation of the algorithm).
For every untrusted assembly P , let P 0 = inline(P ). The
execution trace0 of P 0 satises sound mediation.
Proof. Assuming that P did not contain any calls to the
policy before rewriting, all calls to the policy in P 0 come
from inside the generated code block. Using the gener-
ated traces (Lemma 3), completing the proof is trivial.
The third property we consider is transparency: a pol-
icy enforcement system is transparent if it has no observ-
able eect on programs that satisfy the policy. We for-
malize this by considering the eect when inlining calls
to policy methods that do nothing, they return immedi-
ately. We call such methods passive.
Denition 6 (Equality modulo policy calls). Two
abstract execution traces trace and trace0 are equal mod-
ulo policy calls if and only if they are equal after remov-
ing all calls to and returns from policy methods.
Denition 7 (Transparency). Let I be an inlining
algorithm. Let P be a program, and let P 0 be the in-
lining of P with I using only passive policy methods. I
is transparent if, for all such P , the trace of P 0 is equal
modulo policy calls to the trace of P .
Clearly, if policy methods are non-passive, a program
may behave dierently after inlining. In general, the de-
sirable situation is that policy methods are indistinguish-
able from passive policy methods until the untrusted pro-
gram violates the policy.
Theorem 3 (Transparency of the algorithms). The
inlining algorithm in Figure 2 is transparent.
The algorithm dened in Section 3.2 transforms an
existing program P in a new program P 0 that has a
strong static relation with the original program.
First, we dene a function instrMap that maps the
instructions of the original program P to the correspond-
ing instructions of P 0. If the instruction is a call to a
security-relevant method in P , then the function maps
to the rst instruction of the generated block of code in
P 0.
Denition 8 (Mapping of instructions). For each
method reference mref , let instrMap(mref; i) be the
position in mref in P 0 of the instruction that was at
position i in mref in P .
Lemma 4. Let instr be an instruction at index i in
mref in P and instr0 be the instruction at index
instrMap(mref; i) in mref in P 0. Then instr = instr0
except
{ If instr = call mref and mref is security-relevant,
then instrMap(mref; k) is the index of the rst in-
struction of the generated block of code.
{ If instr = br k then instr0 = br instrMap(mref; k).
{ If instr = brtrue k then instr0 = brtrue
instrMap(mref; k).
Next, we dene a second function callMap that maps
the position of all call instructions in P to the corre-
sponding position in P 0.
Denition 9 (Mapping of call instructions). For
each method reference mref , let callMap(mref; i) be
the position in mref in P 0 of the call instruction that
was at position i in mref in P .
For all security-relevant calls, this function maps to the
original call instruction in the middle of the block of gen-
erated code. For the rest, it maps to the corresponding
instruction according to instrMap.
The algorithm also induces a strong relation between
the exception handlers of P and P 0 which we call excMap.
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Denition 10 (Mapping of exception handlers).
For each method reference mref , excMap(mref; i) is
the position in mref in P 0 of the exception handler that
was at position i in mref in P .
Lemma 5. Let (tb; te; type; cb; ce) be the exception han-
dler at index i in mref in P and (tb0; te0; type0; cb0; ce0)
be the exception handler at index excMap(mref; i) in
mref in P 0. Then
{ type = type0
{ (tb; tb0); (te; te0); (cb; cb0); (ce; ce0) 2 instrMap(mref; i).
Finally, for each local variable dened in the body
of each method reference of P , P 0 has a local variable
with the same type at the same index in the body of that
method reference, but the body of that method reference
in P 0 can have additional local variables.
This strong static relation between P and P 0 create a
strong equivalence relation between the states of P and
P 0:
Denition 11 (Structural equivalence modulo pol-
icy enforcement). An execution state (H;S;E) is struc-
turally equivalent modulo policy enforcement with an
execution state (H 0; S0; E0) if and only if (H,S,E) is equal
to (H',S',E') except for
1. Alpha renaming of the addresses in the heap.
2. Each activation record S0i may have additional vari-
ables.
3. The program counters pci and pc
0
i of all activation
records Si and S
0
i except the top records satisfy pc
0
i =
callMap(mref; pci).
4. During normal execution mode, the program coun-
ters pcn and pc
0
n of the top activation record Sn and
S0n satisfy pc
0
n = instrMap(mref; pcn).
5. During exception handling mode, the next excep-
tion handler indexes i of E and i0 of E0 satisfy i0 =
excMap(mref; i) and the program counters pcn and
pc0n of the top activation record Sn and S
0
n are in the
same relative position with respect to all remaining
exception handlers.
Lemma 6. For every untrusted assembly P , let P 0 =
inline(P ). For every execution state sk reachable by P
in k steps, there exists an execution state s0l reachable by
P 0 in l  k steps, such that sk and s0l are structurally
equivalent modulo policy enforcement and the abstract
traces of both runs are equal modulo policy enforcement.
Proof. By induction on k:
1. Initial step: When k = 0, choose l = 0 and the prop-
erty trivially holds.
2. Induction step: Let k0 = k   1. Using the induction
hypothesis, we know that there exists an l0 such that
sk0 and s
0
l0 are structurally equivalent modulo policy
enforcement and the abstract traces of both runs are
equal modulo policy enforcement.
We case split on s0k:
(a) If the execution is in normal execution mode, and
the instruction is a call instruction to a security-
relevant method and the current method is inside
P , then s0l0 is also in normal execution mode and
the current instruction is the rst instruction of
the generated code fragment (Figure 3).
In step 1. of the generated code inside P 0, all ar-
guments are stored in local variables, but the vari-
ables that also exist in P in the same method are
not modied. Step 2. reloads all arguments on the
stack again, and step 3. calls the before method of
the policy. As the policy methods are passive, the
execution returns to step 4. where the arguments
are reloaded. Finally, the call to the security rele-
vant method is executed and we enter the trusted
system libraries.
Let  be the amount of evaluation steps to reach
the state after entering the security-relevant method,
and let l = l0 + , then sl is structurally equiv-
alent modulo policy enforcement with sk. Since
calls to policy methods are ignored, the abstract
traces are equivalent modulo policy enforcement.
(b) If the execution is in normal execution mode,
and the instruction is a return instruction from a
security-relevant method and the previous method
is inside P , then in s0l0+1 the execution is in nor-
mal mode and the instruction is the rst instruc-
tion in the generated code fragment after the security-
relevant call.
In step 6. of the generated code inside P 0, the re-
turn value is stored in a local variable, but again
this does not modify the pre-existing variables in
P . Step 7. reloads the arguments and the return
value, and step 8. calls the after method of the
policy. As the policy methods are passive, the ex-
ecution returns to step 9. Finally, the return value
is placed on the stack again, and the execution
continues with the rst instruction after the gen-
erated code fragment.
Let  be the amount of evaluation steps to reach
the end label, and let l = l0 + , then sl is struc-
turally equivalent modulo policy enforcement with
sk. Since calls to policy methods are ignored, the
abstract traces are equivalent modulo policy en-
forcement.
(c) If the execution is in exception handling mode
inside a security-relevant method, the last excep-
tion handler is unsuitable to handle the excep-
tion and the previous method is inside P , then in
s0l0+1 , the exception handling mechanism contin-
ues searching inside the previous method, where
it will nd the exception handler inside the gen-
erated code fragment.
In step 12. of the generated code, the exception
value is stored (again this does not modify the
pre-existing variables in P ). Step 13. reloads the
arguments and the exception and step 14. calls
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the exceptional clause of the policy. As the policy
methods are passive, the execution returns to step
15. where the exception value is restored. Next,
step 16. rethrows the exception. Finally, the ex-
ecution system steps through all exception han-
dlers inserted by the rewriter, but will not nd
one.
Let  be the amount of evaluation steps to the
rst exception handler of original code, and let
l = l0 +, then sl is structurally equivalent mod-
ulo policy enforcement with sk. Since calls to pol-
icy methods are ignored, the abstract traces are
equivalent modulo policy enforcement.
(d) If the execution is in normal execution mode,
and the instruction is a throw instruction inside
a method of P , or the execution is in exception
handling mode and will propagate the exception
to a method inside P and the current method is
not a security-relevant method, then in s0l0+1 we
might need to execute exception handlers in P 0
that are not present in P .
Let  be the amount of evaluation steps to the
rst exception handler of the original code, and
let l = l0 + , then sl is structurally equivalent
modulo policy enforcement with sk. Since calls to
policy methods are ignored, the abstract traces
are equivalent modulo policy enforcement.
(e) All other cases are done by executing just one
instruction of both P and P 0.
The transparency theorem is a direct corollary of this
lemma.
4 Virtual Methods
To support virtual method calls in our model of the
.NET CLR, the following extensions are needed. The
VM keeps track of a map of object references to their
actual type (the function actualTypeOf). The new in-
struction callvirt performs a virtual call: it looks up the
method to be invoked dynamically based on the run-time
type of the receiver, and then behaves like a regular call.
Figure 11 in the appendix gives the evaluation rule for
the callvirt instruction.
If our inliner would treat callvirt in the same ways
as call, complete mediation would break. There are three
issues to be dealt with.
First, lemma 2 would break. Suppose a security-relevant
method B :: m overrides a non-security-relevant method
A :: m in a superclass A (Figure 5). A virtual call with
static target A :: m would not be processed by the in-
liner, yet it could lead to an invocation of B :: m at run
time.
We deal with this rst issue by requiring that the set
of security-relevant methods is upward closed.
Denition 12 (Upwards closure of a set of meth-
ods). A set of methods is upwards closed if and only if
A
publicvirtual void m()
B
public override void m()
Trusted Libraries
Figure 5. Violating complete replacement
A
public virtual void m()
C
Trusted Libraries
Figure 6. Inheriting security-relevant methods
no method in the set overrides a method that is not in
the set.
In practice, this is not a real restriction, as methods can
always be added to the set of security-relevant methods,
even if the policy does impose constraints on them.
The second issue arises when inheriting security-relevant
methods. Suppose A :: m is a security-relevant method,
and the untrusted assembly creates a subclass C of A
that does not redene m (Figure 6). Then a call that
statically looks like C :: m is actually a call to A :: m.
Clearly, we can not require C :: m to be in the set of
security-relevant methods, as it is in the untrusted ap-
plication, and the policy writer typically does not even
know it exists.
We address this issue by forbidding inheritance of
security-relevant methods in the untrusted assembly. Again,
this is no restriction, as overriding is allowed, and the un-
trusted application could override the security-relevant
method and then simply do a base call if the same be-
havior as the original method is desired. In fact, such a
transformation could even be done automatically when
no redenition is found. The base call in the transformed
program will be recognized by the inliner as a statically
bound call to a security-relevant method.
The third and last issue to address is how to deal with
dynamic dispatch to policy methods. Since the method
called is determined dynamically, the determination of
the appropriate policy methods now also needs to be
done dynamically. We handle this by creating a dispatch-
ing method for each virtual method that is security-
relevant (See Figure 7). The dispatching method uses
runtime tests on the actual type of the target to de-
termine the actual method that will be invoked. If this
target method is security-relevant, then the dispatching
method calls the corresponding policy method. Other-
wise, it returns from the dispatching method. The pro-
gram rewriter now inserts calls to these dispatching meth-
ods instead of the actual policy methods.
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public void BeforeMDispatcher(Atarget) {
if(target is B) {
if(target is D) { BeforeDM (target); }
else { BeforeBM (target); }
}
else if(target is C) { BeforeCM (target); }
else { BeforeAM (target); }
}
A
m()
B
m()
Trusted Libraries
C
m()
D
m()
Figure 7. Dispatching methods
With these three extensions, the resulting inliner is
completely and soundly mediating and transparent in
the presence of virtual calls.
5 Delegates
Delegates are essentially type safe function pointers. A
delegate encapsulates a set of method references of the
same signature as the delegate. Calling the delegate in-
vokes all the methods in the set. A delegate can be passed
on to other code where it is possible to call the delegate
without statically knowing its target methods. Therefore
delegates are challenging for a caller-side inliner.
To maintain the complete mediation property of our
inliner, we enforce the property that the untrusted appli-
cation never holds a reference to a delegate that contains
a pointer to a security-relevant method. By consequence,
a call to a delegate is never a call to a security-relevant
method.
First, we extend the program rewriter to deal with
the case where the untrusted assembly creates delegates.
To create a delegate containing a method pointer, an ap-
plication must rst load the method pointer on the stack
(using the ldftn or ldvirtftn instruction), and then it must
call a Delegate subclass constructor. When the program
rewriter parses an attempt to load a security-relevant
method pointer on the stack, it creates a new wrapper
method inside the application that does a normal call to
the security-relevant method, and a pointer to this wrap-
per method is pushed on the stack. Hence the delegate
will not point to the security-relevant method, but to
the wrapper method. The program rewriter transforms
the body of the wrapper method to insert calls to the
policy, thus preserving complete mediation.
Second we need to impose a constraint on the trusted
libraries: no method in the trusted API should create
delegates that contain security-relevant methods and pass
them to the untrusted assembly in any way. For the
security-relevant methods we have considered so far, the
trusted libraries never create delegates that contain security-
relevant methods.
With these extensions, our program rewriter is soundly
and completely mediating and transparent, even in the
presence of delegates:
Theorem 4 (Sound and complete mediation). Given
an implementation of the base class libraries where se-
curity relevant methods are upward closed and where no
function pointers to security relevant methods are re-
turned to the application, for every untrusted assembly
P , let P 0 = inline(P ). The abstract trace trace0 of P 0
satises complete and sound mediation.
6 Implementation
The research reported on in this paper is done in the con-
text of the project Security of Software and Services for
Mobile Systems (S3MS) [20]. The inlining algorithm de-
scribed in this paper has been implemented for the full
.NET Framework, and for the .NET Compact Frame-
work running on mobile devices such as smartphones.
We used the Mono.Cecil [12] libraries to parse and gen-
erate MSIL.
The execution system we describe in this paper hides
a part of the complexity of the real .NET CLR. While
implementing our approach, we encountered some chal-
lenging issues (in addition to the ones we already dis-
cussed). For example, the real CLR forbids entering a
protected region (a try block) with a non-empty evalua-
tion stack and it resets the evaluation stack when leaving
a protected region. Our approach inserts new try-catch
handlers, thus we store the entire evaluation stack be-
fore entering the try block, instead of just saving the
arguments for the security-relevant method. To do so,
we implemented a simple one-pass data ow analysis to
compute the types on the stack. We store the values on
the stack in local variables, and reload them after the
catch-blocks.
Furthermore, the real CLR forbids entering a pro-
tected region when the current object is not fully initial-
ized in constructors. Initialization statements for elds
are executed before an object is fully initialized. If these
statements use security-relevant methods, the program
rewriter inserts try-catch handlers and the current ob-
ject is not fully initialized upon entering the try block.
We solved this issue in our implementation by generat-
ing wrapper methods for these security-relevant methods
(like we did with delegates).
Our experience with the implementation is promis-
ing. The performance overhead of the inlining is very
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small (this conrms performance measurements done for
other IRM's [10]), and the inliner can handle real-world
applications that are used as case studies in the S3MS
project.
A more in depth introduction as well as a simple
example can be found in Desmet et. al. [6].
7 Related Work
Both the current Java Virtual Machine [18] and Mi-
crosofts Common Language Runtime [11] use stack in-
spection to enforce security policies on untrusted code.
The security policies that can be enforced in our ap-
proach are more exible, since the entire history of events
can be used. Resource constraints are an example of the
kind of policies that are not enforceable using stack in-
spection.
SASI [8] and PoET/PSLang [9] are two policy en-
forcement tools based on security automata [22]. Both
techniques are based on inline reference monitors. Sasi's
event system is very powerfull, as arbitrary machine in-
structions can be monitored, but it has a higher perfor-
mance impact. PoET/PSLang targets Java applications
and Erlingsson and Schneider have shown that it can be
used to enforce stack inspection based policies, and that
the performance is competitive [10]. In contrast with our
approach, they make no claims about complete media-
tion or transparency.
Naccio [13] also monitors security-sensitive opera-
tions, but instead of inserting instructions inside the ap-
plication or the system libraries, a new wrapper library
is created that enforces the security policy and delegates
control back to the original libraries.
Polymer [3] is a policy enforcement system based on
edit automata [17]. To master the complexity of policies,
Polymer supports composition of complex security poli-
cies using smaller building blocks. In contrast with our
approach, polymer uses callee-side rewriting to enforce
security policies.
The work in this paper can been seen as a particular
instantiation of Aspect Oriented Programming [16] tar-
geting security policy enforcement on untrusted code.
Because our rewriting algorithm is much simpler than
the weaving mechanisms in full AOP, it is easier to prove
correctness.
The abstract traces in our system are similar to the
fully abstract trace semantics of JavaJr [15].
The approach on which this paper is based, originally
developed in [23], was the rst inline reference monitor
based approach which is policy ignorant. It was imple-
mented as a security architecture for the .NET platform
[7], and the additional challenges that multithreading
bring were studied by Dam et al. [5,4]. The impact of the
time model was investigated by Basin et al. [2]. Finally,
an alternative approach to achieve complete mediation
is by using the membrane pattern in object capability
secure languages [1].
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a caller-side rewriting algo-
rithm for MSIL { the bytecode of the .NET virtual ma-
chine { where security checks are inserted around calls
to security-relevant methods.
The algorithm has been implemented and can deal
with real-world .NET applications. Moreover, the algo-
rithm has been proven correct for a simplied model of
MSIL and the .NET virtual machine. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst provably correct inlining algo-
rithm for an intermediate language that supports both
virtual methods and delegates.
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Appendix
A Operational Semantics
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S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
instr = ldc.x v evalStack0 = evalStack; v S00 = S0; (pc+ 1; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = ldloc i adr = locAdr[i]
v = heapLookup(H; adr) evalStack0 = evalStack; v S00 = S0; (pc+ 1; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = stloc i evalStack = evalStack0; v
adr = locAdr[i] H 0 = heapUpdate(H; adr; v) S00 = S0; (pc+ 1; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = ldarg i adr = argAdr[i]
v = heapLookup(H; adr) evalStack0 = evalStack; v S00 = S0; (pc+ 1; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = starg i evalStack = evalStack0; v
adr = argAdr[i] H 0 = heapUpdate(H; adr; v) S00 = S0; (pc+ 1; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H 0; S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = br target S00 = S0; (target; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
instr = brtrue target evalStack = evalStack0; v v == 0 S00 = S0; (pc+ 1; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
instr = brtrue target evalStack = evalStack0; v v! = 0 S00 = S0; (target; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
Figure 8. Evaluation rules for normal execution (Part 1)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = call T ::M argTypes(T ::M) =
 !
A 1::n
evalStack = evalStack0; !v 1::n argAdr0 =  !a 1::n (with ai fresh) H 0 = heapUpdate(H; !a 1::n; !v 1::n)
locTypes(T ::M) =
 !
L 1::m locAdr
0 =
 !
l 1::m (with li fresh) H
00 = heapUpdate(H 0;
 !
l 1::m; defV al(
 !
L 1::m))
S00 = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref); (0; locAdr0; argAdr0; []; T ::M)
(H;S;E)! (H 00; S00; E)
S = S0; (pc2; locAdr2; argAdr2; evalStack2;mref2); (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
instr = ret retType(mref) = void S00 = S0; (pc2 + 1; locAdr2; argAdr2; evalStack2;mref2)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc2; locAdr2; argAdr2; evalStack2;mref2); (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
instr = ret retType(mref) 6= void
evalStack = evalStack0; v evalStack20 = evalStack2; v S00 = S0; (pc2 + 1; locAdr2; argAdr2; evalStack20;mref2)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) instr = throw
evalStack = evalStack0; val E0 = (val; 0) cal 6= null S00 = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E0)
Figure 9. Evaluation rules for normal execution (Part 2)
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S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref) E = (val; n) n = #excHa(mref) E0 = (val; 0)
(H;S;E)! (H;S0; E0)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
E = (val; n) n < #excHa(mref) excHa(mref)[n] = (from; to; type; cfrom; cto)
from > pc _ pc  to _ actualTypeOf(val) 6< type E0 = (val; n+ 1)
(H;S;E)! (H;S;E0)
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
E = (val; n) n < #excHa(mref) excHa(mref)[n] = (from; to; type; cfrom; cto) from  pc < to
actualTypeOf(val) < type E0 = (null; 0) evalStack0 = val S00 = S0; (cfrom; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref)
(H;S;E)! (H;S00; E0)
Figure 10. Evaluation rules for exception handling
S = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack;mref)
instr = callvirt T ::M isV irtual(T ::M) = true argTypes(T ::M) = T;
 !
A 1::n
evalStack = evalStack0; t; !v 1::n   !args = t; !v 1::n T 0 ::M = lookupMethod(actualTypeOf(t); T ::M)
argAdr0 =  !a 0::n (with ai fresh) H 0 = heapUpdate(H; !a 1::n;  !args)
locTypes(T 0 ::M) =
 !
L 1::m locAdr
0 =
 !
l 1::m (with li fresh) H
00 = heapUpdate(H 0;
 !
l 1::m; defV al(
 !
L 1::m))
S00 = S0; (pc; locAdr; argAdr; evalStack0;mref); (0; locAdr0; argAdr0; []; T 0 ::M)
(H;S;E)! (H 00; S00; E)
Figure 11. Evaluation rule for virtual calls
